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• Innovation-lagging and fiscally weak countries in the European Union cut their
public research and innovation (R&I) budgets during the crisis, while innovation-
leading and fiscally stronger countries forged ahead with public R&I spending.
There is therefore an increasing research and innovation divide in Europe. 
• The European Union, with its growing R&I resources managed by the European
Commission can only partly redress this increasing divide. But the Commission
has not used its powers to their full extent to allow member states in weak fiscal
positions to maintain public R&I support. Furthermore, the application of fiscal
rules has not taken R&I into consideration.
• Understanding the degree to which public R&I budgets in the EU have been used
‘smartly’ during the crisis and whether the European Commission has made ‘smart’
recommendations on public R&I as part of the European Semester, requires an
assessment of the long-term impact on growth. Unfortunately, there have been
few such assessment exercises.  
• The European Commission should play a greater role in supporting member states
in their consideration of public R&I for smart fiscal consolidation.
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1. Although education is an
area of smart consolidation
closely related to R&I, a
comprehensive treatment
of tertiary education expen-
diture is beyond the scope
of this Policy Contribution.
2. The impact and hence
justification for public fund-
ing of science and innova-
tion goes beyond its
economic effects on GDP
growth; it also encom-
passes societal challenges
such as health and a clean
environment. This Policy
Contribution is restricted to
a more narrow question,
namely the justification for
public R&I budgets as areas
of smart fiscal consolida-
tion, which is why our
analysis concentrates on
the growth-enhancing
impact of public R&I.
3. Source: Eurostat and
OECD. GERD can be split by
source of financing. The
government-financed part
of GERD is what we are
interested in. Both series
have their strengths and
weaknesses. GBAORD
covers budgeted items,
while GERD covers actual
expenditures. GBAORD
allows direct comparison
with the other budgeted
items. GBAORD data is more
recently available com-
pared to GERD.
1 SMART PUBLIC R&I CONSOLIDATION
The European Union's dangerous cocktail of high
debt in some countries and subdued growth calls
for smart fiscal consolidation. Cost-cutting pro-
grammes should minimise the potentially nega-
tive short-term effect on economic activity, while
establishing a foundation for long-term growth,
with growth-enhancing expenditure safeguarded
from cuts, or even increased.
The areas most often highlighted as needing pro-
tection in the context of shrinking overall budgets
include infrastructure, education and research and
development. In its rhetoric at least, the EU has pro-
moted the favouring amidst consolidation of gov-
ernment research and innovation (R&I)
investment. As noted by Barbiero and Darvas
(2014), the European Commission states in its
2013 Annual Growth Survey that “investments in
education, research, innovation and energy should
be prioritised and strengthened where possible,
while ensuring the efficiency of such expenditure.”
This Policy Contribution asks how this encourage-
ment to safeguard public R&I spending in a time
of fiscal consolidation has been translated into
practice1. We first look at how EU public R&I budg-
ets and policies have been affected by crisis
measures and find an increasing intra-EU split,
with the stronger countries forging ahead and the
weaker countries further cutting their R&I support.
We also examine to what extent the European
Commission has remained true to its pronounce-
ments on public R&I support in smart fiscal con-
solidation, in terms of both the management of the
EU budget and the Commission's monitoring of
member state R&I budgets and policies in the
European Semester. Finally, we address whether
public R&I budgets have been used smartly. What
do the trends in public R&I spending mean for
long-term growth? Have the Commission's coun-
try-specific recommendations on publicly-funded
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research and development been smart? To
answer this, we look at the scarce evidence on
evaluation of the growth-enhancing effects of
public R&I expenditure2. We conclude with some
suggestions for what can be done to make the
public R&I budgets of EU countries smarter.
2 TRENDS IN PUBLIC R&I SPENDING IN THE EU
IN CRISIS TIMES 
To examine how public expenditure on R&I fared in
Europe during the crisis (ie since 2007), we use
GBAORD (government budget appropriations or
outlays for research and development) and GERD
(gross expenditure on R&D) data3.
2.1 Trends in public R&I budgets in EU countries
during the crisis
We first assess whether EU countries cut or
expanded their public R&I budgets to a greater or
lesser extent than other public expenditure
(Figure 1).
For the EU as a whole, public outlays on R&I ini-
tially increased as part of the stimulus packages
launched in many member states at the onset of
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1%
1.2%
1.4%
1.6%
80,000
82,000
84,000
86,000
88,000
90,000
92,000
94,000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
% of GDP (right scale)
% govt. expenditure (right scale)
GBOARD (€ millions, left scale)
Figure 1: Trends in government expenditure on
R&I, EU total (2007-12)
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EUROSTAT.
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ary consolidation position: countries with an
above-median cumulative change in their
structural primary balance since the year in
which consolidation started (the year with
the lowest negative structural primary bal-
ance in the period 2008-10). Source: EURO-
STAT and AMECO.  Also included in the high
fiscal consolidation group are the Economic
Adjustment Programme countries. 
Figure 2 shows that innovation leaders increased
public expenditure on R&I during the crisis, by
more than their increase in other public expendi-
ture. Innovation followers reduced their public R&I
expenditure more than other categories of public
expenditure. Innovation laggards, including Italy
and Spain, substantially cut public R&I expendi-
ture, even more so than other parts of their budg-
ets, resulting in a considerable drop in the share
of R&I in public expenditure, which was already
below the EU average. The crisis seems therefore
to have widened the gap between EU countries in
public R&I expenditure. Most innovation laggards,
perhaps not by coincidence, are also under
greater fiscal consolidation pressure. Countries
under high fiscal consolidation pressure have sig-
nificantly cut their public R&I expenditure. This
trend of a growing EU public R&I divide is also
reported in the OECD STI Scoreboard (2013) and
in ERIAB (2014).
Figure 3 on the next page shows there are signifi-
cant differences even between countries within
the crisis. Compared to overall public expenditure,
the share of R&I-related expenditure went up
between 2007 and 2009 but started to decline
thereafter, when stimulus spending stopped. R&I
as a share of total public spending currently
stands at 1.4 percent (2012), which is a small
decline from the pre-crisis level (1.5 percent in
2007). As a share of GDP, R&I spend has resumed
its pre-crisis level of about 0.7 percent.
There is therefore no strong evidence that EU coun-
tries, on average, sacrificed their R&I budgets more
than other government expenditure during the
crisis. However, this favourable treatment of R&I
seems to have been part of a one-off stimulus.
More recently, R&I spend has been declined. It
should also be noted, ignoring the crisis impact,
that the share of R&I in public budgets is not high
in general, particularly when considering the
potentially high social rates of returns from public
R&I investment (see Veugelers, 2014, for more on
this). The relative importance of R&I in public budg-
ets is substantially lower in the EU than in Japan,
South Korea, Switzerland and the US.
Behind the average EU trend, about half of the EU
countries have stabilised or increased the share
of their public budget spent on R&I4. The other half
has seen a drop in R&I as a share of total public
spending5. In an attempt to further explore these
differences, we distinguish groups of countries:
• Innovation leaders (Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Sweden and the UK), innovation fol-
lowers (Austria, France, Ireland, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands) and the rest (innovation
laggards);
- This classification is based on the European
Commission's Innovation Union Scoreboard
indicator for innovative performance pre-
crisis (2007); countries are classified
according to whether they are well above,
around or below the EU average score.
Source: EU Innovation Union Competitive-
ness Report 2007. 
• High fiscal consolidation countries (Bulgaria,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain)
versus the rest (low fiscal consolidation);
- This classification is based on their budget-
4. Austria, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Germany, Greece,
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia and
Sweden.
5. Belgium, Cyprus, Finland,
France, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Romania,
Slovenia, Spain and the
United Kingdom.
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Figure 2: Trend in government R&I expenditure,
2007-12 (GBORD as % of government
expenditure)
Source: Bruegel calculations on the basis of EUROSTAT and
AMECO.
reducing the share of R&I in its public budget to
an historic low (1.1 percent in 2012). Greece also
had to cut its R&I budgets mostly in line with its
overall budgetary cuts, but these cuts have deep-
ened, reducing the share of R&I in Greece's over-
all budget from an already-low share (0.7 percent
in 2012). By contrast, Portugal has expanded its
public R&I budget and has only made cuts in
recent years. R&I cuts in Portugal have been pro-
portional to other budget cuts, meaning that the
share of R&I in Portugal's public spending remains
high (2 percent in 2012).
2.2Trends in composition of public R&I spending
during the crisis
Changes in the size of public R&I budgets matter,
but we must also consider how the shrinking or
expanding R&I budget is spent, and which spend-
ing categories win or lose. Crisis might put the
emphasis on short-term targeted impacts and
returns, rather than long-term impact. Crisis might
also lead politicians to seek to leverage more pri-
vate R&I investment, including a search for more
public-private co-funding.
GBAORD data shows that about half of public R&I
funding in the EU is ‘general purpose’ spending
and the crisis has hardly changed this: from 48
percent in 2007 to 52 percent in 2012. The small
increase is a result of innovation-following and lag-
ging countries catching up with the higher shares
that innovation-leading countries dedicate to non-
targeted support (58 percent in 2012).
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our groups. Among the leading innovators,
Sweden, Germany and Denmark increased their
public R&I budgets even more than other govern-
ment spending. Germany spent 2 percent of its
public budget on R&I in 2012. In Finland the
increase has remained flat since 2011. As a con-
sequence it is no longer the EU country spending
the greatest share of its budget on R&I. The UK
began to cut its public R&I budgets already in the
early years of the crisis, and more deeply than its
overall public expenditure.
Among the innovation followers, Austria has
increased its public R&I budget substantially, by
more than its overall public budget (1.6 percent in
2012). France has increased its public R&I budget
on average, but not consistently. In the Nether-
lands, there was a decline in the R&I share of the
public budget. Among the innovation laggards,
Estonia was under high financial consolidation
pressure but has nevertheless continued to
expand its R&I budget so substantially that it is
now the EU's highest public R&I spender, in rela-
tive terms: 2.1 percent in 2012. 
Most countries under high fiscal consolidation
pressure cut their public R&I budgets, but some
did so more forcefully than others. Ireland cut its
public R&I budget by somewhat more than its
overall public budget (1 percent in 2012). Spain
cut its public R&I budget substantially, by even
more than its overall public budget, driving the R&I
share of its overall budget down to 1.25 percent in
2012 from 1.95 percent in 2007. Italy has seen
similar substantial cuts in public R&I spending,
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Figure 3: Trends in government expenditure on R&I (GBORD as % of govt. expenditure), 2012 relative to 2007
Source: Bruegel calculations on the basis of Eurostat. Note: Countries are reported in decreasing order of Innovation Union
Score; Innovation Union Scoreboard 2007.
In terms of R&I support by sector, overall in the
EU27, most funding goes to higher education insti-
tutes (56 percent) with public research organisa-
tions receiving 32 percent. Funding to the
business sector represents only 13 percent
(2011, Figure 4). These shares remained stable
during the crisis. Consolidation or expansion of
public R&I budgets therefore seems to have been
sector-neutral. Compared to the EU27, the US
spends more of its public R&I budget on the busi-
ness sector. From 2007-11, the US significantly
increased its public R&I expenditure. The largest
increment went to the business sector.
In the EU, noteworthy shifts in recipient sectors
have occurred in only a few countries (Figure 4,
right panel). In the UK and Austria, the business
sector has seen its share increase. In Spain, the
business sector saw its share decline. In Sweden,
France and Portugal, the higher education sector's
Reinhilde Veugelers  UNDERCUTTING THE FUTURE?
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share has increased.
Public budgetary support for business R&I
includes direct support through grants, but also
indirect support, predominantly through tax
incentives. This indirect support is not visible in
the GERD or GBAORD data. Figure 5 shows that tax
incentives have become the main channel of gov-
ernment support for business R&I in countries
such as Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands
and Portugal. With the exception of Portugal, in all
of these countries, use of tax credits increased
much faster than grants during the crisis. In Aus-
tria, Denmark, Hungary and the UK, tax incentives
and grants have about equal weight. Some coun-
tries, including Estonia, Finland, Germany and
Italy, have no substantial R&I tax incentives. Ger-
many has long debated the introduction of R&I tax
incentives. The use of tax credits therefore seems
to mark another divide in Europe: some countries
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Figure 4: Government GERD by sector: EU27, US (left panel) and selected EU countries (right panel)
Source: Bruegel calculations on the basis of Eurostat.
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Figure 5: Government support for business R&I: subsidies vs tax incentives
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6. Lacking resources for co-
funding may imply that not
all of the allocated budget
can be implemented (see
the table in the annex for
the implementation rates of
allocated Structural Funds).
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are heavy and increasing users, while others con-
tinue to refrain from using the instrument. 
The increasing shift towards tax credits during the
crisis is unsurprising given that tax credits for R&I
are an easier-to-use instrument in times of fiscal
consolidation. They do not require allocation of
public funds upfront, only foregone earnings. They
may also have the advantage that they are more
lightly monitored under EU state aid rules,
because they are expected to be less competition-
distorting because of their general applicability.
However, there is no strong evidence that tax cred-
its are a more effective instrument for boosting pri-
vate R&I (see Veugelers, 2014). 
3 EUROPEAN COMMISSION POLICY ON PUBLIC
R&I IN A TIME OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
The commitment of the European Commission to
research and innovation is manifest in the Europe
2020 strategy and the Innovation Union Flagship
Initiatives. But how has the EU treated public R&I
during the crisis, both through its own EU budget
(Structural Funds and research funds), and its
monitoring of member state R&I budgets and poli-
cies through the European Semester?
3.1 EU own R&I budget spending
The major sources of EU R&I funding are the Struc-
tural Funds and the Framework Programme
research funding – the Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme for Research and Development (FP7)
from 2007-13, and Horizon 2020 from 2014-20.
This funding complements member state own
public investment in R&I.
From 2007-13, of the €347 billion (current prices)
Structural Funds budget, about €86 billion, or a
quarter, went to R&I. In some countries, Structural
Funds for research and innovation are of the same
magnitude as national R&I budgets, meaning that
Structural Funds (almost) double the volume of
government R&I funding included in GBAORD data
for the country (see the table in the annex and
Figure 6). This is the case for Estonia, Hungary,
Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. In Latvia, Struc-
tural Fund allocations even triple the public R&I
budget. But also in Portugal, Structural Funds rep-
resent 31 percent of total public R&I. In Greece,
Structural Funds support for public R&I represents
40 percent. However, the low implementation rate
brings the actual share down to 21 percent6. In
Spain, allocated Structural Funds make up 10 per-
cent of total public R&I funding. But a low imple-
mentation rate reduces this share to 7 percent, the
same share as in Italy. 
Funding acquired through the competitive, excel-
lence-geared Horizon 2020 programme (and its
FP predecessors), also represents extra public R&I
funds available in different countries from the EU
budget, but this is not measured in the GBAORD
data. Nevertheless, for some EU countries with
small national R&I budgets, this funding can rep-
resent a substantial amount of money, even if the
funds need to be acquired through competitive
calls and on the basis of R&I excellence (see the
table in the annex and Figure 6). During 2007-13,
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FP7 funds. Latvia is excluded as an extreme outlier in the left panel.
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this was the case for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Malta and Slovenia. Even for
countries such as Belgium, Greece, Ireland, the
Netherlands and the UK, the share can be sub-
stantial – greater than 10 percent.
The EU budget serves as mechanism to somewhat
ease the growing public R&I divide in Europe. EU
funds are relatively more significant for innova-
tion-lagging countries with low national R&I budg-
ets. Figure 6 illustrates clearly the negative
relationship between EU funds as a share of
national R&I spending and countries’ innovation
scores. This is particularly evident for the Struc-
tural Funds. But it also holds, albeit to a much
lesser degree, for research funds allocated
through excellence-based competitions. 
EU funding in countries with declining R&I spends
is likely to become even more important. With
Horizon 2020, EU funding for R&I will amount to
€80 billion, an increase of 30 percent compared
to its predecessor (2007-13). The share of R&I in
the total EU budget is now about eight percent,
much higher than the share of R&I spend in
member state budgets (1.4 percent in 2012). In
addition, a greater share of the Structural Funds is
earmarked to be spent on Europe 2020 chal-
lenges during 2014-20: from 50 to 80 percent.
3.2Country-specific recommendations for R&I in
the European Semester
The European Commission monitors the progress
of member states towards their own R&I targets in
pursuit of the Europe 2020 goals. This monitoring
happens annually through the European Semes-
ter (eg Hallerberg et al, 2012). An analysis of the
BOX 1: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR R&I IN THE 2013 EUROPEAN SEMESTER
• The programme countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal) had their own template, only report-
ing on framework condition improvements. Reforms relevant for innovation were only mentioned
for Greece. 
• For the non-programme countries, only nine out of the 23 countries received a country-specific
recommendation that involved their public R&I budget. These countries were the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania.
The recommendation in each case was to prioritise and increase the public R&I budget, or reverse
the decline. 
- Included is Germany, an innovation leading country without any fiscal consolidation pressure,
and with increasing public R&I budgets. The recommendation for Germany was that it should
set even more ambitious targets. Recommendations were also issued to Estonia, an innova-
tion follower that has increased the R&I share in its public budget substantially, but is under
fiscal consolidation pressure, and the Netherlands, which is not above average with respect to
fiscal consolidation pressure, but has recently seen a decline in the share of R&I in its public
budget. 
- Among the innovation laggards, only five countries received an R&I prioritisation recommen-
dation. All are countries under fiscal consolidation pressure: Poland and Czech Republic, where
the share of R&I in the public budget is increasing, and Hungary, Lithuania and Romania, which
have declining public R&I budget shares. Innovation-lagging countries receiving no recom-
mendation to prioritise R&I include Italy and Spain.
• On framework conditions relevant for R&I, out of the 23 non-programme countries, Belgium, Bul-
garia, France, Italy, Malta and Romania received a country-specific recommendation. Again, this
is a mixed bag of countries: innovation followers and laggards, some under fiscal consolidation
pressure and some less so, with diverging public R&I budgets. Enhancing the connection between
public research and the business sector was recommended for Estonia, France, Latvia, Luxem-
bourg and Malta. Improving efficiency of public intervention and policy evaluation was recom-
mended for the Czech Republic, Finland, Poland and Romania.
Source: Bruegel on the basis of Innovation Union Competitiveness Report 2013, Eurostat and Council Recommendations
document – 2013 (and Economic Adjustment Programme for programme countries – latest available).
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Commission's latest country-specific recommen-
dations delivered as part of the European Semes-
ter system of economic policy coordination shows
that recommendations related to R&I are patchy
(Box 1). This is not new. Pisani-Ferry and Sapir
(2006) reached a similar conclusion when they
analysed the capacity of the Commission to mon-
itor member state National Reform Programmes
under the Lisbon Strategy, the Europe 2020 strat-
egy's predecessor.
Overall, R&I-related country-specific recommen-
dations in the European Semester seem rather ad
hoc. The recommendations that are put forward
are not supported by the systematic use of eval-
uation tools to assess the smartness of national
R&I proposals in terms of their impact on long-
term growth, or to identify the critical framework
conditions that need to be improved to enhance
efficiency of public R&I instruments.
3.3The ‘investment clause’ use for public R&I
budgets 
A further means by which the Commission could
promote R&I investment during crisis as part of
smart fiscal consolidation is through the so-called
‘investment clause’. This allows member states
that are in deep recession, but that have budget
deficits below the three percent of GDP threshold
and that respect the public debt reduction rule, to
temporarily deviate from the fiscal targets of the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), to the extent of
their national co-funding of EU-funded invest-
ments. The Commission proposed this in summer
2013 in response to the request of the European
Council (2013) to explore “the possibilities offered
by the EU’s existing fiscal framework to balance
the productive public investment needs with fiscal
discipline objectives ... in the preventive arm of the
SGP.” The investment clause, which extends
beyond R&I, has however so far not been acti-
vated, as reported by Barbiero and Darvas (2014). 
All this evidence suggests that despite many com-
munications advocating that R&I investment be part
of smart fiscal consolidation in the member states,
the European Commission has not itself established
a firm track record in implementing such a prefer-
ence. Nor has it set up a rigorous framework for pro-
moting R&I in the European Semester framework.
4 ARE EU PUBLIC R&I BUDGETS BEING
CONSOLIDATED SMARTLY?
The evidence so far has shown an increasing
public R&I divide in the EU during the crisis, with
the innovation-lagging and fiscally-weak countries
cutting public R&I budgets, while the innovation-
leading and fiscally stronger countries forge
ahead with public R&I spending. The European
Commission, with its growing resources for R&I, is
able to only partly redress this increasing divide.
The Commission has so far not used its powers to
their full extent to allow member states in weak
fiscal positions to deviate from the fiscal targets
in order to maintain public R&I support.
The critical question that still needs to be
addressed is whether these diverging trends are
good or bad news. Are the cuts in the weaker coun-
tries evidence of smart use of public R&I invest-
ment, ie were they effective in supporting
recovery and growth and in eliminating ineffi-
ciently spent public resources? Or have the public
R&I cuts been too aggressive, jeopardising long-
term growth? Is the Commission right to not allow
members states in weak fiscal positions, which
also happen to be weak innovators, to shelter their
public R&D budgets from fiscal exigencies? Or
should the Commission be more lenient and exer-
cise the investment clause option?
Understanding the degree to which public R&I
budgets in the EU have been used ‘smartly’ during
the crisis and whether the EU has made ‘smart’
recommendations on public R&I in the European
Semester requires an assessment of the long-
term impact on growth.
When innovation-lagging countries are also less
efficient in turning public R&I into growth, consol-
idating public R&D budgets in these countries is a
more effective outcome until the efficiency and
effectiveness of their public R&I spending is
improved. To benefit from the growth effects from
R&I, it could be a better strategy for innovation-
lagging, weak fiscal-consolidating countries to
improve their capacity to absorb R&I investments
made elsewhere, rather than to fund with public
resources their own R&I. Building such absorptive
capacity may still require public R&I policies, but
of a different kind. Effective leveraging of external
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7. http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/state_aid/moderni-
sation/index_en.html#rdi
8. The up-to-date evaluation
methodologies (partly)
addressing the causality
include randomised experi-
ments, diff-in-diffs, regres-
sion discontinuity design,
instrumental variables,
matching, structural estima-
tion).  The EU State Aid
framework includes a
methodological appendix
describing the state-of-the-
art techniques for evalua-
tion schemes.  Each have
their limitations and are
only valid under strict
assumptions.
9. The SIMPATIC project aims
to contribute to micro-
assessment of the causal
impact of R&D grants and
tax credits, by assessing
the net private and social
rates of return using
structural modelling and
integrating this micro-
assessment into an
endogeneous R&D macro
model to assess the long-
term impact on growth and
jobs (see
www.SIMPATIC.eu).
R&I spending into local growth could thus at least
partly address the increasing growth divergence
resulting from the R&I investment divergence. Cut-
ting back on own public R&I in weaker countries
might in this case not harm the growth potential
of the innovation-lagging countries, as long as
these countries replace this with an improved
capacity to effectively leverage external R&I
spending into local growth. 
Assessment of the growth effects from public R&I
requires the appropriate methodologies to evalu-
ate the causal impact of public R&I on long-term
growth. Conté et al (2009) report that almost all
EU member states indicated that they had some
evaluation schemes in place to assess their public
R&I support. Most member states that conduct ex-
post evaluations do this every few years, tracing
headline indicators such as numbers of publica-
tions and patents. Only a few member states have
made ex-ante and ex-post evaluation a fixed ele-
ment of their R&I programmes and projects. The
new guidelines for state aid recently proposed by
the European Commission includes evaluation of
state-aid schemes as a condition for approval for
some schemes7.
Although the number of studies evaluating public
R&I programmes have grown substantially, they
are still grappling with the causal link between
public intervention and its impact on growth, and
establishing proper counterfactuals to assess
what the growth outcome would have been for the
beneficiaries had they not received the support.
Various methodological improvements to assess
causality are increasingly being used8, but still
require a cautious interpretation of the causal
nature of the results. In addition, most evaluation
studies only look at the immediate impact of
public support on private research and develop-
ment and innovation, checking whether it crowds
out or generates additional private investment
(the so- called ‘additionality’). There are few
assessment exercises that pin down the longer-
term social returns and growth impact of R&I,
which is the impact that matters for smart fiscal
consolidation. Assessing social returns and the
growth impact is a much more complex exercise
requiring a longer-term perspective, an analysis
of the diffusion effects from R&I across institu-
tions, sectors and countries and an assessment
of the framework conditions in place for innova-
tion-based growth. This can only be done when
integrating the micro-additionality exercises into
endogenous growth macro-models9.
Box 2 discusses two assessment examples. Both
suggest that public R&I spending in innovation-
lagging countries is less effective.
BOX 2: EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC R&I IN EU COUNTRIES
Conté et al (2009) estimated for a panel of EU countries the efficiency of various R&I inputs (public
and private) for generating various R&I output measures (patents and publications), and then exam-
ined the factors explaining the efficiency measure. Among the factors they considered was the stock
of public R&I, for which they find a positive effect, suggesting that countries with a bigger stock of
public R&I have a more efficient innovation system. Their efficiency analysis unfortunately does not
extend into the impact on GDP growth and does not include proper counterfactuals.
Roeger et al (2013) run simulations using QUEST III, a semi-endogeneous global Dynamic Stochas
tic General Equilibrium (DGSE) model,  to analyse the effects of various structural reforms in south-
ern European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), including the use of R&D tax credits. R&D
tax policy was modelled as closing the gap between the country in question and the average level of
the three best-performing euro-area countries. R&D tax additionality parameters were calibrated as
an average from the literature and assumed the same for all countries. The use of R&D tax credits
yielded positive, but small long-run effects on GDP (ranging from 0.1 percent for Spain to 1.4 percent
for Greece). The structural reforms that yielded the most significant results in the long run were poli-
cies to reduce the share of low-skilled workers, generating an increase of 15 percent in GDP for Italy
and Spain. For Greece, the greatest economic gains were realised from product-market reforms (39
percent of GDP). For Spain, product-market reforms would also result in a substantial increase in GDP
(16 percent).
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5.1 What the European Commission can do: own
spending
The Commission should ensure that its own
increasing public R&I funding is used smartly. The
effectiveness of Horizon 2020 and the Structural
Funds for R&I needs to be properly evaluated,
using transparent, state-of-the-art evaluation
methodologies, with proper counterfactuals.
This evaluation should involve an assessment of
the effects of EU public R&I funding on private R&I
investment, and should also assess the effects of
EU R&I funding on national public R&I funding:
does it complement or crowd-out member state
R&I funding? Most importantly from a smart fiscal
consolidation perspective, the analysis should
assess the impact on European growth.
All this requires an integration of micro and macro
assessment exercises. This will allow an assess-
ment to be made of how the EU budget can be
better used for European growth and how it can be
used to tackle the growing public R&I divide
between member states.
5.2What the European Commission can do:
country-specific recommendations
The Commission should improve its analytical
capacity to underpin the country-specific recom-
mendations on public R&I that it makes to
member states in the European Semester. The
Commission should use operational models
blending micro and macro evaluations, to evalu-
ate how member states' public R&I proposals will
boost their long-term growth enhancing capacity,
and to identify the complementary reforms that
need to be made to improve this capacity.
The Commission should devote more resources to
further develop its applied macro-models as tools
in support of the country-specific recommenda-
tions for R&I (such as the QUEST model). This
requires further developing the R&I modelling and
endogenous growth characterisation in these
‘Smart consolidation featuring R&I investment needs to take a long-term perspective and to
have sound evaluation frameworks in place to assess whether the potential for high growth
returns from public R&I are indeed being realised.’
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
When one considers the potentially substantial
growth dividend and social rates of return from R&I
investments, at least in the long-run, and the risk
of market failure before these social rates of return
can be secured, public support for R&I investment
is a good candidate to be prioritised in the midst
of smart fiscal consolidation. But smart consoli-
dation featuring R&I investment needs to take a
long-term perspective and to have sound evalua-
tion frameworks in place to assess whether the
potential for high growth returns from public R&I
are indeed being realised. Evaluating the effec-
tiveness of public R&I budgets should go beyond
assessing short-term additionality impacts on pri-
vate research and development and innovation.
Smart fiscal consolidation by EU member states
should include assessments of the longer-term
social rates of return in excess of private rates of
return, and a blending of micro-evaluation results
into macro models to assess the long-term growth
impact. Such an integrated approach will allow an
assessment to be made of the complementary
framework conditions needed to realise the
growth dividend from own public R&I, and from
R&I investments made elsewhere. The approach
will also enable the identification of the structural
reforms (in product markets, labour markets,
financial markets) that are needed to generate
innovation-based endogenous growth. This is an
agenda for smart consolidation in member states,
whether they are innovation lagging, following or
leading countries. It is only when this agenda is
tackled that we will start to see if the growing R&I
divide we have witnessed since the crisis is an
example of smart fiscal consolidation or, on the
contrary, a bad omen for an increasing growth
divide in Europe.
But beyond the member states, there is also an
important role for the European Commission to
support the member states in their analysis of
public R&I for smart fiscal consolidation. The
reminder of our recommendations focus on the
Commission's role.
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10. http://ec.europa.eu/
research/era/index_en.htm.
models. This also requires calibrating these
models with the latest insights from country spe-
cific micro-empirical assessments of the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of each country’s public
R&I spending. 
An advantage of deploying integrated macro-
models at the EU level compared to a country-by-
country approach is that the EU scale allows
assessment of the cross-country spillovers from
national R&I policies. If Italy spends less public
money on R&I, does this increase the supply of
foreign R&I employees in the UK? If the UK intro-
duces a patent box scheme, should France follow?
How much could be gained from coordinating
member states' R&I tax credits, in order to avoid
the negative effects of R&I tax competition? Such
an integrated analysis of public R&I spending
would also allow assessment of the effectiveness
of alternative public R&I strategies for lagging
countries to better absorb R&I spending done
elsewhere. How much does Greece, for example,
benefit from increased German R&I expenditure?
This spillover analysis requires well-developed
modelling and an empirical calibration of the vari-
ous mechanisms via which knowledge transfers
between member states: for example, through
cooperation in innovation networks, through
mobility of researchers, through multinational
firms or through licensing. Better assessment of
spillovers and their effects should be at the core of
the European Commission’s European Research
Area (ERA) project to establish a fully integrated
internal market for knowledge flows10. 
Only when member states public R&I plans are
properly assessed for their growth impact in an
integrated framework, will we be able to conclude
if the growing EU public R&I divide is a good or a
bad trend, the implications it might have for the
future growth divide in Europe and what country-
specific recommendations on public R&I the Euro-
pean Commission should issue to minimise the
chances the growth divide becoming critical.
5.3What the European Commission can do:
activating the investment clause
The investment clause exemption for national co-
investment of Structural Funds should be imple-
mented, at least the R&I component of it. But the
exemption should be made conditional on putting
in place ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of the proj-
ects that will be funded. The evaluations need to
be approved by the Commission before exemption
can be granted.
The investment clause exemption should be
extended to national R&I co-funding of other EU
investments beyond Structural Funds, such as the
European Investment Bank (EIB)/European
Investment Fund funding and Horizon 2020 fund-
ing. Because EIB projects are assessed by the EIB
inter alia for their social rates of return before they
are funded, national co-investments for these
funded projects can be exempted. The EIB's analy-
ses include assessment of social rates of return.
The Commission's new guidelines for state aid for
research and development and innovation spec-
ify proper ex-post evaluation as a condition for
approval of  member state R&I schemes (grants
and tax credits). The evaluation strategy proposed
by each member state needs to satisfy some min-
imum methodological conditions. Conditional on
receiving clearance from the Commission compe-
tition authorities, member state spending on R&I
grants and tax credits can be included in the
investment clause exemption.
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ANNEX: Table (page 13): EU Structural funds 2007-13 for RTDI, EU FP7 funding and EU’s country spe-
ciﬁc recommendations for innovation and member states’ pressure for ﬁscal consolidation
Source: Bruegel on the basis of Innovation Union Competitiveness Report 2007, Eurostat and Council
Recommendations document, 2013 (and Economic Adjustment Programme for programme countries,
latest available).
Notes to table: the programme countries in italics (Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal and Greece) had a differ-
ent template for their country specific recommendations. (1) Implementation as a percentage of allo-
cated funds in the period 2007-13. (2) Average annual allocation (2007-2013) as percentage of average
annual GBOARD (2007-2012). We considered the innovation ranking according to the Innovation Com-
petitiveness report 2013. In this classification, innovation leaders are SE, DE, DK and FI, innovation fol-
lowers are NL, LU, BE, UK, AT, IE, FR, SI, CY and EE, innovation laggards are IT, ES, PT, CZ, GR, SK, HU, MT,
LT, PL, LV, RO and BG.
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